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Can PROMOD Prevent the Escalation of Commitment? 
The Effect of a Group Facilitation Technique on an Investment Decision 
Erich H. Witte & Frauke R. Feldhusen 
 
Abstract 
In the present study, the escalation of commitment was examined, i.e. the tendency 
to invest too much in projects, when to decide at a second time about a further 
investment in the same project. Many such investment decisions are actually made 
in groups. Thus, the group processes can be responsible for the escalation of 
commitment, because social influences often are more relevant for group decisions 
than informational aspects, which impedes rational decision making. A method to 
improve group decisions and performance is the group facilitation technique 
PROMOD. The experimental results support the presumption that PROMOD can also 
prevent the escalation of commitment by eliminating social influences within the 
group.  
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Can PROMOD Prevent the Escalation of Commitment? 
The Effect of a Group Facilitation Technique on an Investment Decision 
     Politicians adhere to decisions without examining the effects after execution. 
Banks assign credit although they never receive the money again. Executive 
committees invest too much money in projects which are beyond remedy. These are 
only a few examples of how commitment can escalate. People begin something and 
for different reasons they find it hard to withdraw from it even if greater losses are at 
risk. Instead, they continue instead of backing out before it is too late. Why do people 
throw good money after bad money (Garland, 1990)? 
     In today’s society, groups opposed to single individuals are increasingly 
responsible for making important decisions  Both politics and the economy rely on 
groups to make improved and more effective decisions. One common assumption is 
that groups decide on a rational basis. This, however, is a delusion. Groups seem to 
have a stronger tendency to show escalating behaviour (Seibert & Goltz, 2001), 
although the escalation of commitment has rarely been investigated in groups.  
     The objective of the following experiment is to point out one possibility of 
preventing the escalation of commitment in groups. The group facilitation technique 
PROMOD should be capable of impairing factors which strengthen the escalation of 
commitment, thus resulting in the avoidance of wrong decisions as well as the 




Theoretical background on escalation of commitment 
     Wolff (2005) documented a definition escalating behaviour, which characterises 
escalation situations by five criteria. In this definition, investments encompass 
resources such as money, time or feelings. The first necessity for an escalation 
situation is a sequence of investments. Within a single decision with no further 
consequences, there is no possibility to escalate commitment, therefore implicating 
that people can only show escalating behaviour in situations where a possibility to 
withdraw is given. Additionally, all investments transacted must be lost at the time of 
withdrawal. A further criterion states that negative feedback related to the project’s 
success must follow at least once. If there was no referral to project failure 
beforehand, it is impossible to argue somebody is investing too much. Finally, the 
actual chance of attaining the goal must be unclear. That means every decision in an 
escalation situation is made with uncertainty.  
     Escalating behaviour is defined as follows:  A decision maker invests too much 
(money, time or effort) in an escalation situation. As a research objective, it is now 
necessary to define how much is investing too much. In order to attain a rational, 
correct decision for an uncertain situation, a bench mark is required.   
     Many authors are involved in researching the occurrence of escalation of 
commitment. Staw (1976) first examined the phenomenon using the role-play case 
A&S (Adam & Smith company), in which test persons received information about the 
economic development of the company. Even though the feedback gets worse, 
many people miss the right point to withdraw. Field studies, on the other hand, 
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document the losses resulting from escalating behavior. Drummond (1994a) 
examined the hiring of an incompetent manager. The company employed him 
despite the fact that he was obviously not qualified. Colleagues hoped in vain that he 
would grow into the job with time. Outstanding observers demanded his discharge; 
however he first quit the job when he was blamed for unproven sexual annoyance. 
On another note, Ross and Staw (1986) described how the $78 million  EXPO 86 
project, the world exposition of 1986 in Vancouver, became a $311 million 
nightmare. 
     Similar fields of research deal with entrapment and sunk cost (Staw, 1997). If a 
project is nearly finished and much has already been invested, the decision makers 
tend to complete it even if negative feedback has received. Staw and Hoang (1995) 
provided a further example. In the NBA (National Basketball Association), coaches 
sent players they invested the most in more frequently on the field. The less 
expensive players sat more often on the bench. According to the performance and 
achievements observed during the games, the coaches should have decided 
differently.  
     Research on entrapment (Brockner & Rubin, 1985) is particularly concerned with 
the process of getting involved in a project. Test persons must solve a riddle and 
require an encyclopaedia to do so, which others pretended to use. The longer the 
test persons waited with answering, the less money they were able to win. They 
even waited so long that all profits were lost. An everyday example is waiting for an 
elevator, although the distance could have already been covered by foot. 
     There are many theories about why people show escalation behaviour. Wilson 
and Zang (1997) stated 17 different explanations for the escalation of commitment. 
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An integrated theory has not been developed so far. Staw (1997) summarized the 
factors affecting the escalation of commitment in a classification scheme and 
developed a temporal and aggregated model. Yet the model still requires further 
examination.  
     Explanations for the escalation of commitment can be found in our socialisation. 
Decision makers want to avoid appearing wasteful and they do not want to loose the 
investments already made. Arkes and Ayton (1999) found out that adults generalize 
the decision rule “do not waste” over all decisions. On the contrary, children do not 
generalize. Instead, they are able to base their decision more strongly on future 
benefits than on preceding investments. In addition to this decision rule, a socially 
controversial conviction is that people should bring things they started to an end. A 
common parental advice for children is to empty their plate. On another note, people 
who quit a project do not gain positive reinforcement. The tenor is rather that the 
particular person did not invest enough time or effort. Finishing tasks started is 
desired in our culture.  
     A main explanation of the escalation of commitment is found in the self-
justification hypothesis (Brockner, 1992). People continue an action they have 
begun, because quitting would mean having made a mistake. They reduce cognitive 
dissonance by continuing the action so that past investments are not seen as being 
made in vain. By further pursuing the project, investments appear legitimate to 
oneself as well as to others. This effect is particularly strong if the acting person is 
responsible for a negative consequence. 
     The prospect theory (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1986) provides another explanation. 
In escalation situations, prior investments did not result in the benefits expected, i.e. 
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some negative feedback occurred. People must then to decide between a sure loss 
and the chance to compensate the losses. As losses have already been incurred, 
further losses seem less threatening. Additionally, people perceive a concrete loss 
as more exciting than a probable one in the future. Withdrawing from a project 
corresponds to an actual loss. The theory would predict to continue the project, 
because the chance to regain concrete losses is given (Whyte, 1993).  
Factors affecting the escalation of behaviour 
     Researchers determined a multitude of factors which either intensify the 
escalation of commitment or cause de-escalation. Soman (2001) found that people 
are more willing to invest time than money into a project. Therefore, decision makers 
impair projects by investing more time than the needed money. Research 
investigations reveal that individuals who made the original decision show stronger 
escalating behaviour (Staw, 1976), thus indicating a stronger sense of responsibility 
causes higher investments (Becker Beck & Wend, 2004). Garland (1990) showed 
that the closer a project is to completion the more difficult it is for people to quit it. 
High involvement, also without responsibility for the decision,  is a further factor 
causing the escalation of commitment (Brockner, Houser, Birnbaum, Lloyd, Deitcher, 
Nathanson & Rubin, 1986). Consequentially, we can assume that those who highly 
identify themselves with the organisation invest more (Becker-Beck & Wend, 2004). 
Moon (2001b) found the escalating effect of achievement striving. Members of 
decision-making bodies are especially characterised by a form of motivation called 
“need for achievement”.  
     Researchers also discovered a set of de-escalating factors. The most important 
one is the setting of limits (Boulding, Morgan & Staelin, 1997). In order to enable 
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rational decisions, criteria quantifying success are necessary. Only experts should 
make important decisions, for they usually do not exhibit escalating behaviour due to 
their scope of responsibility because of the salience of decision criteria (Moser, Hahn 
& Galais, 2000). However, especially in political and executive committees, it can not 
be ensured that members are experts for all decisions at issue. 
     Special aspects are worth mentioning for groups. Groups are actually more 
vulnerable to escalating commitment than single decision makers (Whyte, 1993). Yet 
Kameda and Sugimori (1993) came to contradictory results. They led the higher 
escalation of commitment found in individuals to the diffusion of responsibility in a 
group situation. Their hypothesis states that the single individual is more responsible 
for the decision made and tends to irrational behaviour. We assume an opposing 
effect. Another factor leading to additional escalation is the fact that other group 
members orient themselves on the behaviour of the other subjects in the group. The 
problem arises if the other group members show escalating behaviour (Brockner & 
Rubin, 1985). The question behind this different prediction is whether the influence of 
the individual responsibility is higher than the conformity effect. 
     Simonson and Staw (1992) compared different de-escalation strategies in their 
studies. Most effective were minimum goal setting, decision evaluation on the basis 
of process instead of results and reducing fear of a negative outcome. This was 
examined, however, in individuals. Different influences must be considered for 
groups. One supportive group decision-making technique is the devil's advocacy 
method. However, it did not provide the desired reduction of the escalation of 
commitment (Becker Beck & Wend, 2004). We are therefore in search of a method 
which can prevent the escalation of commitment in groups. 
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Special problems in group decision making 
    In order to facilitate group decisions to be made on today’s complex issues, 
decisions need to be achieved in a faster and improved manner, i.e. reaching 
broader agreement in less time. Ideally, other group members should compensate 
errors made by individuals. Yet in practice, groups can rarely fulfil this expectation. 
Coordination losses arise if group members organize their communication and 
distribute tasks. Another problem stems from the fact that the group carries out no 
preparatory coordination work, for example when selecting a solution strategy, but 
instead immediately starts with the result search (Hackmann & Morris, 1975). Effects 
regarding motivation losses such as social loafing (Latané, Williams & Harkins, 
1979) additionally reduce group performance. Within the group interaction context, 
individual performance does not reach its maximum potential. In addition, groupthink 
effects (Janis, 1972) also limit performance. Group members tend to adapt their 
opinions uncritically to the majority. 
      Decisions made by the group do not primarily depend on the arguments 
members exchanged. Normative influences are at least equally important. Tindale, 
Smith, Thomas, Filkins and Sheffey (1996) explicated that juries decide even tasks 
without apparent correct solution towards fractions of the members in the group. 
Socio-emotional norm orientations socially shared representations often play a more 
important part than the exchange of arguments (Witte, 1996, 2007; Engelhardt & 
Witte, 1998). Stasser and Vaughan (1996) describe that speakers with a high status 
are perceived as experts and thus their opinions affect a decision independently of 
their arguments. According to the extended group situation theory (EGST; Witte, 
1996), informational influences are maximal only if no social values are represented 
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by the discussed material and two opposing groups with median commitment to a 
constituency are debating. These requirements are rarely given in practice. 
Especially in executive boards, a discussion between two different parties is unusual. 
A further condition for good decision-making is that group members must be able to 
reach a good solution individually with high likelihood. Otherwise, the probability for a 
good solution in the group is smaller than for a single person (Kerr, 1996). 
Nevertheless, it is wise to leave important decisions to groups. Most often one 
person alone does not dispose of all relevant information necessary for a particular 
decision.  Above all, teamwork is essential in international projects. In politics, we 
rely on more than one person to make decisions for an entire country etc. 
     A method to improve group performance should contain the following aspects. 
The group interaction should be limited to a minimum in order to reduce normative 
influences and attach importance to informational aspects (Witte, 2007). The higher 
the quality of individual input and the more independently group members work in 
the beginning, the better group performance will be (Sorkin, Hays and West, 2001). 
By proceeding in this manner, group members should develop a common 
understanding of the problem by taking the various individual perspectives into 
consideration (Reimer, 2001). 
 
PROMOD 
     The group facilitation technique PROMOD (procedural moderation) establishes 
these conditions. The method was developed at the University of Hamburg (Witte, 
2007; Witte & Sack, 1999). 
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     The particular feature of this method is that group members do not interact 
directly with each other, but rather indirectly through a facilitator. In the first phase, a 
dialogue between a group member and the facilitator takes place, thus increasing 
individual motivation. During this initial stage, the facilitator encourages individuals to 
collect all factors potentially influencing the problem (as-is analysis). In the second 
phase, the person notes the desired (sub-) objectives on cards (to-be analysis). All 
cards are structured in form and content. Relations may be illustrated with arrows. In 
a third phase, the individual group member develops measures to achieve the 
desired objectives and writes these on cards as well. The person judges the 
suggested measures according to risks and chances and makes a provisional 
decision. The facilitator then examines this structure entirely and looking for missing 




Figure 1: Illustration of a PROMOD chart (BMP) 
 
     During the entire procedure, the facilitator supports the person by asking 
purposeful questions and help to differentiate the structure. This procedure conduces 
to deepen the individual view of a problem and to improve the quality of the 
individual decision. Besides that, the group members make their first decisions 
independently. 
     The following consensus phase is concerned with the exchange of different 
structures created by individual group members. Each member receives the 
anonymous structures of every other group member. Again in individual work, the 
group member goes through these structures alone with the facilitator. It is possible 
to ask questions regarding comprehension. Then, group members have the chance 
to amend their own structure by incorporating specific aspects yet unconsidered or 
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unknown, or they may even develop new solutions. In further steps, individual group 
members may comment other structures and receive the annotations made by 
others regarding their own structure. The objectives of this step are to enable 
individual understanding of different perspectives and to exchange information. 
Thus, they compile a corporate solution by agreement or by vote if there is no 
consensus. 
     Normative influences play only a small part in this procedure. The group 
members can concentrate on argumentation, meaning there is no pressure to 
conform. There is also no need to coordinate, since the facilitator relieves group 
members of this task. Motivation losses are not expected, because working with the 
facilitator alone leaves no chance to withdraw from responsibility. By dissolving the 
group’s dynamics, it is possible that normative influences are reduced to a minimum. 
     Different studies confirm the influence PROMOD has on improving group 
performance. Witte and Lechner (2003) showed that groups supported by PROMOD 
obtain better achievements than control groups when solving the Desert Survival 
problem. They more frequently selected the correct solution, namely to remain at the 
location of the plane crash, and ranked the given objects in more rational orders. In 
the SIMAD study (Witte & Sack, 1999), a committee has to prevent the propagation 
of AIDS in a city using adequate measures. PROMOD groups achieved significantly 
better achievements in this highly complex problem and developed more measures 
to solve the problem than the control group did. 
     The method appears particularly promising regarding the escalation of 
commitment, since it contains many de-escalating factors. Clear objectives are 
specified during facilitation to make to success measurable. Besides that, the 
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method allows a process-orientated justification of the decision made, since the 
decision-making process is recorded. The amount of investments should remain at a 
minor level without reducing desired factors such as the sense of responsibility and 
the identification with the organisation. Moser et al. (2000) examined the influence of 
being an expert on escalation of commitment. Experts in the loan industry learned a 
decision rule which allows them to charge off the money already invested. They were 
able to reduce the danger of commitment escalation. However, they executed this 
rule only in areas of their expertise. They can decide on the basis of defined 
structures which makes more rational actions possible in many decision situations. 
Experiment 
Method 
 A total of 218 students enrolled in various subjects participated in this study 
from June - December 2005. They received credits as an incentive. The average age 
is 25.4 years, 70 % of the participants are female and 30 % male.  
 The experimental design includes three different kinds of groups – a group to 
determine a baseline decision, a control group with free discussion, and a 
PROMOD-group. The dependent variable is the amount invested in a development 
project in Hamburg, i.e. how much money people invest in the project’s second 
phase. In addition, 6 experts evaluate the success of the project in the future and 
give their written advice.. Further variables were the sense of responsibility ("I feel 
responsible for the decision"), the identification with the organisation ("I identify 
myself with the EuroInvest AG.") and the city of Hamburg ("I identify myself with the 
city of Hamburg"). The scenario (Becker- Beck & Wend, 2004) modified for Hamburg 
depicts an investment company (EuroInvest AG) which has already invested 200 
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million Euro into a building project in the city (see appendix A). Some problems arise 
until it is time to make a decision. In the relevant decision phase, participants can 
invest between 0 and 1 billion Euros. Six experts are available as decision support, 
whereas three offer positive and three negative feedback comments. 
     The instruction for the baseline, providing the “correct” solution for the scenario 
without emotional impact, began with a short definition of escalation of commitment 
before of the decision. Becker, Beck and Wend (2004) found that information about 
the possible irrationalities causes de-escalation. Additionally, the test persons 
receive instructions to give a recommendation on a rational ground without personal 
responsibility for the first decision. That implies that both the sense of responsibility 
as well as the identification with the company or the city remain low, therefore 
facilitating a rational decision. The six different experts are to be ranked according to 
their plausibility. Investigating the baseline is important, since objectively calculating 
the correct solution is difficult in the given scenario. The success of the assigned 
interventions can be measured with baseline data.  
     Test persons in the PROMOD-facilitated experimental group as well as in the free-
discussion control group are to imagine they are the executive committee of the 
EuroInvest AG investment company. According to the story, they have already made 
the initial decision to start the project unanimously. 
     Control group variables were measured three times. Before the group discussion 
started, test persons note their individual decision. Afterwards, they discussed their 
ideas in groups of three, made a joint decision and documented the corporate result. 
Following they note the individual decision again, in order to measure the social 
impact of the group on the individual decision. 
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  For the experimental groups facilitated by PROMOD we reduced the full cycle 
of this group technique to main influence processes to save resources. We acquired 
nine individual decision structures and possible comments first from nine persons 
who went through the first dialog phase of PROMOD to generate these structures. In 
the experiment, the facilitator guides only one real test person through the entire 
facilitation process. The individual amount of investment is selected beforehand. In 
the first dialogue phase, the test persons compile an individual decision structure. In 
the following consensus phase, the test person randomly receives two other decision 
structures created by others labelled as second and third group members. 
Participants are then to include the information offered by the two other structures in 
their decision. Additionally, they can comment the other structures and receive 
comments on their own structure made by the fictitious group members. For the 
exact operational sequence during facilitation see Appendix B. After facilitation, 
subjects answer all questions once again. 
     For both the group discussion and the PROMOD facilitation a time limit of 90 
minutes was given.  
Results  
     As expected, the amount of investment made at the beginning is significantly 
connected with the level of the sense of responsibility (r = .446) and the identification 
with EuroInvest AG (r = .318). (All significant results reported have a level of 
significance of 0.01.) People with a high sense of responsibility and high 
identification with the company show the largest investment (570 million Euro, s = 
225 million Euro, N = 94) as also revealed in the Frankfurt scenario (Becker-Beck & 
Wend, 2004). The test persons in the baseline (N = 124) feel significantly less 
 15
  
responsible (t = 9,051, df = 1) and identify less with the organization (t = 9,940, df = 
1) than the two other groups, thus group manipulation has succeeded as desired. 
The people in the baseline invested significantly less than the two other groups in the 
beginning of the experiment. (t = 5.628, df = 1). This value also corresponds to the 
results in the Frankfurt study. The average of the nine predetermined PROMOD 
structures is 369 million Euro (s = 204 m Euro). This value does not differ 
significantly (t = 1.279, df = 1) from the value in the experimental group at the 
beginning. The experimental groups invested 458 million Euro (s = 315 m Euro). The 
nine previously chosen structures simulate other the decision of the experimental 
subjects quite well. (see Table 1). Other measured variables such as sex, age or 
major do not affect the investment amount in this study. 
 
Table 1 
Means and standard deviations for the investment amounts in EUR (million) 
 Mean s N 
PROMOD before group intervention 458  315 25 
PROMOD after group intervention 311 213 25 
Baseline 314 218 124 
Control before group intervention 442 196 69 




Means and standard deviations for corporate identification (“I identify with the 
EuroInvest AG.”) and sense of responsibility (“I feel responsible for the decision.”) 
 Identification Responsibility  
 Mean s Mean s N 
Baseline  2.51 1,358 2,78 1,596 124 
PROMOD before 
intervention 
4,92 0,862 4,96 1,098 25 
Control before intervention 4,10 1,363 4,41 1,332 69 
PROMOD after intervention 5,20 0,707 5,28 0,843 25 
Control after intervention 4,59 1,080 4,84 1,080 69 
Values from 1 = "do not agree at all" to 6 = "totally agree" 
     Group facilitation with PROMOD should fulfil three tasks. Firstly, people are 
expected to show less escalation of commitment. Secondly, the amount of 
investment should decrease not randomly, but rather to a rational level. Thirdly, 
emotional factors should not play an important role for making a decision.   
     In the PROMOD group, the amount of investment decreases to about EUR 147 
million on average. The facilitation can prevent the escalation of commitment and 
supports a rational decision. Before group intervention, participants invested almost 
the same in the open discussion and during the facilitation’s consensus phase. As 
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predicted, the Repeated Measures ANOVA shows that after the group intervention, 
the amounts of investments differ significantly. In contrast to PROMOD, the escalation 
of commitment rises during the open discussion. 
Table 3 
ANOVA Results (2 x 2 factor design with repeated measures) 
Deviation for amount of investment 
 F df Eta² 
Amount of investment before / 
after 
0,564 1 0,006 
Control group / PROMOD 6,826 1 0,069 
Before / after x control / PROMOD 31,136 1 0,253 
N = 94, level of significance = 0,01 
     Schulz-Hardt and Frey (1998) pointed out that researchers have frequently 
investigated the escalation of commitment, but have paid too little attention to 
examining the contrary effects. Do people withdraw from projects too early? In order 
to prove that PROMOD does not have such an effect we raised the baseline. The 
amount of investment evoked in this manner delivers the objective correct decision 
for this scenario. The PROMOD groups should not invest significantly less than the 
baseline does. Otherwise this would imply that facilitation leads decision makers to 
render too careful judgements. As expected, the invested amount of EUR 311 million 
in the PROMOD group does not differ significantly (t = 0.57, df = 1) from the 
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investments made by baseline participants (EUR 314 million). This is strong 
evidence that PROMOD leads to a more rational decision. In contrast, the people in 
the control group significantly invest EUR 553 million, more than the baseline (t = -
8.327, df = 1). 
Figure 2: Means for investments made by baseline, control and PROMOD groups 

















PROMOD, N = 25 control group, N = 69 Baseline, N = 124
     
Before the interventions, the amount of investment and emotional factors such as 
identification and sense of responsibility are correlated as mentioned above. There 
are no significant correlations between these variables after facilitation. As expected, 
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the amount of investment in the PROMOD group does not depend on these emotional 
factors. People are able to solve the problem more rationally, although both test 
persons’ identification with the organization and their sense of responsibility tend to 
increase during facilitation. Thus we cannot attribute the effect of preventing 
escalating behavior to a lack of identification or missing sense of responsibility, but 
rather to the reduction of socio-emotional impacts by PROMOD facilitation. 
     In the control group, the sense of responsibility and identification also tend to rise 
during the open discussion. Contrary to the hypothesis stated by Kameda and 
Sugimori (1993), no responsibility diffusion emerges in the group situation. However, 
the emotional factors such as identification or responsibility do not correlate with the 
amount of investment as well after group discussion. Other shared representations 
seem to be more important for the escalation of commitment.  
     The PROMOD group and the control group had to rate the experts' advice 
regarding their influence on making an investment decision. Three experts (No. 1, 2 
and 6) include positive and the other three (No. 3, 4 and 5) negative feedback 
comments. Calculating an influence score for each written advice the PROMOD 
groups should rate the negative expertises more important and the positive less 
important than the control groups after the intervention. We can indeed verify this 
assumption with the current data. Yet the positive experts are most influential for the 
investment decision, although participants in the baseline group judge the negative 




Means for advice  influence ratings (z-values)  before and after facilitation or 
discussion 
 Before Intervention After Intervention 
Group PROMOD Control PROMOD Control 
Positive Feedback 2,74 2,32 1,97 3,30 
Negative 
Feedback 
-3,00 -1,78 -2,11 -3,44 
 
Discussion 
     The results gathered in this study confirm our hypotheses. Highly identifying with 
the organization and a high sense of responsibility for the decision represent factors 
which intensify the escalation of commitment. However, it is not reasonable for an 
organization  to reduce these factors as intervention because of other side effects: 
Highly identifying with the organization has many advantages. It increases, for 
example, work motivation and work satisfaction. People with high identification also 
mentioned less physical stress (Van Dick & Wagner, 2002). These two factors 
should be maintained in group conditions at work, although they lead to a stronger 
escalation of commitment if not facilitated.  
      Natural groups interacting in open discussions remain behind their potential, 
because social influences are more important than informational ones (Kerr & 
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Tindale, 2004). A possible explanation is the communication of primary, shared 
information (Tindale et al., 1996). That is, people exchange arguments which lead to 
further investments. As the evaluation of these arguments increases, information 
contra investments are rarely mentioned and become therefore less important. The 
group members mutually confirm their point of views, thus escalating their 
investment behaviour. Additionally, the group members follow no special structure 
during the discussion.  This enforces the more frequent exchange of information 
which promotes further investment. They judge this information to be more important 
after the discussion and the group invests even more than initially planned. This 
affects the evaluation of the experts’ advice, too. In the control group, the experts 
with negative feedback tend to become less important for decision-making. 
Participants focus on positive aspects and therefore analyze information less 
critically     In contrast, PROMOD is qualified to prevent the escalation of commitment 
as confirmed by the results of this study. During facilitation, participants specify 
concrete objectives and incorporate all available information. They can justify their 
decision on the basis of the developed structure. . In addition, the other group 
members exert no conformity pressure on the individual during the first phase. 
Participants who make decisions with the aid of PROMOD do not only invest less than 
the control group, but also reside on an investment level similar to the baseline’s 
amount. With PROMOD, people are able to make a more rational decision, just as if 
they were not involved in the problem.. Implementing this facilitation does not simply 
decrease the amount of investment to a level as little as possible; it instead reduces 
the sum to a rational baseline. The identification with the organization as well as the 
responsibility for investments are not diminished, yet people are enabled to make 
decisions independent of these emotional factors, although the individual decision at 
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the beginning shares all the social representations and irrationalities which could be 
eliminated by a facilitated group process. This is the general hope why to decide on 
such highly important investments in groups. However, this is almost never found in 
naturally interacting groups without the help of a facilitating technique. 
Future research 
 In this experiment, PROMOD is only partially simulated. Participants completely 
undergo the first phase of individual decision finding. However, nine pre-determined 
structures replace the two further randomly chosen group members in the second 
phase. In addition, the agreement phase is limited to one step, whereas originally the 
exchange of structures can require more steps. In future experiments, both the 
complete facilitation with three real test persons and the usage of this method in 
practice need to be examined. In this manner, intervention effectiveness can be 
validated. 
     One problem in investigating the escalation of commitment is to decide what 
amount of investment corresponds to a rational decision, i.e. to what point do people 
show “reasonable” or legitimate commitment to a project? To the other extreme, 
people can withdraw from a project too early and therewith not show any affiliation 
with it. This aspect has rarely been investigated so far. What causes more damage? 
Investing too much or withdrawing from a project too early, although it could have 




     When should an organization apply PROMOD? Can we optimize each decision 
with facilitation? In escalation situations, it is relatively simple to use this form of 
group assistance. First, decision makers are to set clear objectives directly at the 
beginning of a project, in order to make success measurable. At every other step in 
the process  a facilitator can use PROMOD to support important further investment 
decisions. Mostly, the question is if and how much should be invested after, for 
example, a budget has been exceeded. Thereafter, one possible alternative is to 
withdraw from the project. In practice, there are enough decision making phases 
which correspond to steps PROMOD facilitates. 
 Yet is it necessary to use PROMOD? Group performance usually remains below 
expectations (Kerr & Tindale, 2004). There is so much unused potential in the 
groups. One can imagine how much money, time or effort one can save if the 
emergent attributes of groups are actually used within decisions and projects.  
     Why do people not use such techniques as PROMOD more commonly? Perhaps 
they feel no or less pressure to change: The common perception of group members 
and single persons is that groups perform better work than individuals (Plous & 
Wesleyan, 1995). Bad group decisions become apparent too late, i.e. after the 
project actually fails. It is essential to train people’s perception of group efficiency, 
because that bestows them with the knowledge crucial to evaluating group 
performance more realistically. With such awareness, team members can apply 
measures to improve their performance. 
 24
  
As the future puts higher demands on decision making processes, facilitation 
techniques not only represent a possible, but especially a necessary intervention in 
group interaction. In this experiment, we find clues indicating that PROMOD is an 
intervention to prevent the escalation of commitment. The results demonstrate how 
the facilitation method assists in not investing too much in escalation situations, while 
on the other hand investing just enough to finalize a project and to make profits out 
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     The real estate company EuroInvest AG develops and cares for projects in first-
class buildings in cities. A three-man executive committee is the highest decision-
making body at EuroInvest. This group must make all decisions concerning large 
investments unanimously. Wrong decisions entailing extensive financial losses 
usually lead to deposition from its executive status. The committee defines itself as 
follows:  
     "We select our cooperation partners carefully and maintain trustworthy contact to 
our economic as well as local persons of charge. That bestowed us with a reputation 
of renowned seriousness. We work on acceptable concepts which put people’s 
needs first, local authorities and trading-operators. Our goal is the advancement and 
extension of urban centers. Our vision is “the future is our city’s center”! 
     In November 2001, your group, EuroInvest executive committee, made the 
path-breaking decision: In Hamburg a new town district will be developed. The 
European Quarter will contain a 90 m office high-rise, the "Euro Tower", a gigantic 
"Urban Entertainment Center" for leisurely activities, two further skyscraper hotels as 
well as a 2 km „European Avenue" with apartments and shops.  
     The European Quarter is planned in three levels of development and should be 
accomplished by the year 2013. Altogether the costs of the project amount to 
approximately EUR 1.5 billion.  
     As consequence of the decision in 2001, for which your group as an executive 
committee of EuroInvest is responsible, EuroInvest has already invested 200 
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million Euro in the "European Quarter" project from 2001 to 2005 in the context of  
development period I. Half of these costs were financed by credits for which interest 
must be paid.  
     The majority of these investments (EUR 150 million) flowed into the acquisition of 
fallow land. The remaining EUR 50 million were used in order to pay the architectural 
competition (the architect's office C.W. was assigned with the large-scale project) as 
well as incidental advertising and administrative costs. 
Project History of Development Period I (2001 – 2005) 
2001/2002:  
• Architectural competition takes place.  
• Technical and economic planning of the “European Quarter” starts.  
• EuroInvest starts with costly publicity for the project.  
2003:  
• The first building applications are handed in to the urban building authority.  
• First success-promising negotiations with potential investment partners and 
tenants are passed.  
• The city of Hamburg promises financial support to EuroInvest for the 
realization of the “European Quarter”. In addition, the “European Quarter” 
should be connected to the public transportation network by a city-financed 




• The permit of the building application for the "Euro Tower" through the city 
Hamburg retards. There is disagreement in the urban committees on whether 
a 90 m high office tower can be integrated into the existing high-rise skeleton 
plan. 
• Thereby the project schedule is delayed. The original start of construction for 
the "Euro Tower" was intended for mid 2004.  
• Despite success-promising negotiations no main tenants for the "Euro Tower" 
are found until now.  
2005:  
• An agreement is reached by the urban committees: The "Euro Tower" may 
have a height of 75 m.  Thus, the "Euro Tower" must partially be re-planned. 
This entails further delays in development. All further building applications are 
approved without restrictions.  
• Due to negotiation difficulties with important investment partners, the 
realization of the "Urban Entertainment Center" as well as the other objects 
advances only hesitantly. In May, a large American real estate bank, the main 
investment partner, withdraws unexpectedly from the project.  
• Today in the year 2005, different experts concerning the “European Quarter” 




Expert 1:  "The European Quarter ranks among the largest and most trend-setting 
projects regarding urban construction in Europe."  
Expert 2:  "The development of the ‘European Quarter’ will strongly invigorate the 
weak economic situation in the Hamburg area."  
Expert 3:  "The budget stop by the city Hamburg complicates the project’s 
financing."  
Expert 4:  "The changes in the capital market let the future of the financial 
prosperity Hamburg appear uncertain."  
Expert 5:  "The risk potential and the unpredictability of the project deter more 
investors." 
Expert 6:  "The economic and urban concept of the ‘European Quarter’ is 
coherent."  
     In the board meeting taking place now your group must decide as the executive 
committee whether and to which extent development period II of the project 
"European Quarter" should be induced. Development period II (2006-2009) mainly 
contains the costs for work contracts and construction for the following objects (the 
individual objects can be arranged flexibly concerning size, office and business 
areas, equipment and quality of the materials, so that development costs of the 




• "Euro Tower": EUR 250 - 300 million 
• "Urban Entertainment Center": EUR 150 - 280 million  
• "European Avenue": EUR 100 - 300 million  
• Infrastructure and park settings: EUR 50 - 100 million 
      "High-Rise II" (EUR 150 - 210 million) and  "High-Rise III" (EUR 120 - 200 
million) as well as still missing sections of the European Avenue should be financed 
and finished in the framework of development period III (2010 - 2013).  
     For the next four years (development period II), an investment volume of up to 
EUR 500 million is available for EuroInvest, further investments can be financed 
through credits. 
     Your group is now confronted with an important decision. 
     If your group continues investing in the "European Quarter", the possibility exists 
that a sum of  EUR 200 million (development period I) plus the amount you selected 
for development period II will have been invested into a real estate project which has 
little chance for success in the opinion of some experts. On the other side, further 
investments could correct the initial difficulties of the project and trigger the success 




Important instructions for the role-play: 
• At the time of the original decision (2001), your group was executive 
committee of EuroInvest and your group made the original decision (2001) 
unanimously. Your group is thus responsible (1) for the original decision in 
2001 and (2) for the amount of investment of EUR 200 millions during 
development period I.  
• In addition, it is very important that you identify with the EuroInvest executive 







Course of PROMOD facilitation in the experiment 
Facilitator Test person 
You need to begin 
each of the 
following cells with 
a capital letter! 
Welcome! reads scenario and 
fills in the first 
questionnaire page 
 
The problem is to decide whether or how much money is to 
be invested in the further project. 
 
Which factors affect the present situation? Are there cause 
factors which affect the problem? How does the current 
unsatisfactory situation look like? What (or who) causes the 
difficulties? What is critical at the moment? What are the 
difficulties? Do you have information referring to the chances 
of success in the past process of the project? Are there also 
positive starting factors? 
Please write these influences on the factor cards. 
writes factor cards 
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Please arrange the cards clearly for you. arranges factor cards
Please number the cards to be able to refer to them better. number factor cards 
Which objectives do you pursue regarding the problem? 
What are the objectives you are heading for? What do you 
want to achieve? Which situation will you be content with? 
What do you want to reach for yourself personally as a 
member of the executive committee or for your company? 
Where do you want to be at the end of the project? How do 
you recognize that everything works out? What does the 
desired output look like? 
Please write this on the objective cards! 
writes objective cards
Now you are to set your own priorities. Please state the most 
urgent and important objectives and at the same time number 
these in the order of your priorities.  




Now we regard the measures to be taken, thus the amounts 
of investment to achieve your objectives.  
Please write some possible alternatives for measures on 
cards. Can you imagine some other measures? How can you 
proceed otherwise? It is also possible to invest more or less? 
Which pros and cons do these alternatives contain? What are 
writes measure 
cards, notes pros and 
cons and decides 
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the chances and risks? Through which measure are your 
objectives achieved best?  
Please make a decision. 
Please read your cards again aloud. It is important that the 
other group members can also understand them. If you were 
a journalist would you leave the formulations like this?  
I do not understand the formulation yet. Can you express the 
point again in another way? 
reads and modifies 
cards 
Regard your complete solution. Is your structure perfected, 
do you need anything in order to make your decision? 
controls structure 
If you like you can draw connecting arrows between the 
single cards in order to clarify the relations. 
connects cards 
Interruption: Facilitator fetches other structures and 
comments  
fils in second 
questionnaire page 
Please read the structures of the other board members 
accurately. Please ask any questions on comprehension. Try 
to understand the decision of the others. 
looks at structures 
Compare your own structure with the others. In which points 
do you agree, where are the differences? Bring to mind the 
merits and flaws of the other structures. 
judges structures 
Please note comments on the other structures to return them writes comment cards 
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to your colleagues. You received the following comments for 
your structure: Comment cards are handed out. 
and reads comments 
Integrate the new information into your own structure. Which 
aspects do you wish to transfer you to your structure? 
corrects structure 
Can you imagine new amounts of investment? How do you 
decide now? Evaluate the chances and risks again.  
Can you approach the other amount of investments in your 
decision? 
modifies the amount 
of investment   
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